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Introduction 
Ideally, the labeling of products based on the production methods used should improve 
consumers’ welfare by offering more choices, while at the same time allowing producers to 
differentiate their products and potentially secure additional profits from consumers who are 
willing to pay (WTP) more for a commodity produced with “preferable” methods.  However, 
producers often express concerns that labeling which promotes the benefits of one technique also 
casts the conventional commodity in a negative light.  For example, milk producers are troubled 
with regards to labeling some milk free of recombinant bovine somatotropin (rBST), which is a 
synthetically produced version of the naturally occurring hormone bovine somatotropin (bST).  
Farmers use rBST to boost the milk yields of their dairy cows.  Dairy organizations are worried 
that by labeling some milk “hormone free”, consumers will stigmatize conventionally produced 
milk (also referred to in this article as “conventional milk”) and therefore avoid purchasing the 
product.
1  In fact, as of January 1, 2008, the State of Pennsylvania no longer permits milk labels 
to include phrases such as “hormone free” or “contains no artificial hormones”, and the State of 
Ohio is considering similar regulations (Martin 2007). 
    In ex ante studies of the impact of rBST on consumers’ milk purchasing behavior, it was 
found that numerous factors would likely reduce the demand for milk produced by cows treated 
with rBST (Kaiser, Scherer, and Barbano 1992).  These factors include the amount of 
information about rBST the consumers possessed, the quantity of milk they consumed, and how 
much they were concerned with milk prices.  This study confirms that, despite assurances from 
the Food and Drug Administration with respect to the safety of rBST for human consumption, 
consumers are not convinced that the use of rBST in the general fluid milk supply is in their best 
interests. 
  The question of the desirability of rBST for consumers has become even more relevant as 
large fluid milk processors and retailers, including Wal-Mart, Kroger, and Dean Foods, have 
begun requiring suppliers to cease the usage of rBST on their dairy herds.  Whether this decision 
was made with the interests of consumers in mind, or for some other reason, remains unclear.  
What is clear, however, is consumers are moving away from purchasing conventionally 
produced milk and towards alternative products that are viewed as safer and more attractive, 
mainly organic milk and rBST-free milk. 
  A shift in consumers’ preferences away from conventional milk, which may or may not 
contain rBST, towards rBST-Free alternatives is likely to have a significant impact on fluid milk 
producers.  Estimates of rBST adoption rates in the United States vary significantly – studies 
have found rates anywhere from 15% in Wisconsin herds to as high as 44% in New York and 
Texas herds (Barham, Foltz, Moon, and Jackson-Smith 2002).  According to Monsanto, the 
largest producer of rBST, 17% of dairy farmers nationwide used rBST to some degree on their 
herds, and these herds accounted for 33% of the total dairy cows in the U.S.  If fluid milk 
retailers and processors continue to push farmers to stop the use of rBST on their herds, there 
will likely be significant costs to the farmers as they transition back to dairy production 
techniques that do not utilize rBST (Forbes 2008). 
  In this research, we address the question of whether the move away from conventional 
milk (and towards milks labeled as free of milk hormones) by fluid retailers is being driven by 
consumers’ bias against rBST or for some other reason.  We consider the potential bias of 
consumers towards conventional milk in the context of psychological stigma, a phenomenon in 
which certain objects become viewed in a negative manner, even when no actual problems or 
health risks have been identified.  The question is addressed in an experimental economics 
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setting by eliciting WTP measures for milk produced via different production methods and of 
varying fat contents from adult subjects.  By eliciting WTP values in an experimental setting, we 
are able to observe directly the behaviors of experiment subjects, rather than using survey 
techniques to pose subjects hypothetical questions.  Through altering the order in which 
participants bid for the different types of milk, we find that consumers are indeed willing to pay a 
premium for rBST-Free milk despite a lack of scientific evidence regarding harmful effects of 
rBST on human health.  Given the premium consumers are willing to pay for milk produced 
without rBST, it is likely that the move towards rBST-Free milk by fluid retailers is indeed being 
driven by consumer preferences.   
 
Literature Review 
Early research involving rBST was mainly concerned with how quickly dairy farmers would 
adopt the new technology and exactly how much milk production would increase as a result of 
the drug’s availability.  Fallert et al. (1987) found that early adopters of rBST would likely see 
reduced unit costs and increased output, but that since rBST was a relatively easy technology to 
implement, gains for the early adopters would be short-lived.  The long run implications would 
depend on how the U.S. Dairy Price Support Program would change to take into account the 
higher production per cow resulting from rBST usage.  McGuckin and Ghosh (1989) likewise 
found that the U.S. government was unprepared to absorb the increased Commodity Credit 
Corporation purchases of milk that would result from rBST adoption, and that the technology 
either needed to be restricted or the support price for milk needed to be reduced.  Tauer and 
Kaiser (1991) alternately proposed that when the rate of adoption for rBST is modeled 
endogenously (as a function of rBST profitability and learning) and voluntary supply controls 
were implemented, the decrease in milk prices resulting from rBST usage were not as severe as 
previous studies predicted when adoption rates were exogenously modeled.  The consensus from 
the early production-side research generally agreed that introducing rBST to supplement milk 
production would tend to increase overall milk production and decrease prices to some degree. 
  While the supply-side effects of the introduction of rBST into dairy herds were well 
documented, the effects of increased milk production, as well as the effects of introducing an 
unfamiliar biotechnology into a familiar good, were less well known.  A limited number of 
studies were made to gauge how consumers would react to the presence of rBST in their milk.  
In a survey of consumers in New York and Virginia, it was found that one-third and one-fifth of 
consumers, respectively, were concerned about the safety of rBST in their milk, and only 30% 
and 35%, respectively, believed that milk supplemented with rBST was safe to drink (McGuirk 
and Kaiser 1991).  Additionally, 85% of the respondents in both states believed that milk 
containing rBST should be labeled as such, the implication being they were not fully convinced 
of the safety of rBST and would like the option of avoiding milk containing the hormone if they 
so chose. 
  In another study of consumer opinions regarding rBST, it was found that, even taking 
into account reduced prices from rBST-induced milk production expansion, there would likely 
be a decrease in milk consumption after the introduction of rBST (Kaiser, Scherer, and Barbano 
1992).  After adjusting for increased consumption due to lower prices, milk consumption was 
still projected to decrease by 1.6%.  A key finding of this study, however, was that many 
consumers did not possess enough information about rBST to make judgments regarding its 
safety, and that a “proactive educational strategy should be pursued by the dairy industry to 
deliver explanations and facts about these technologies to consumers.” 
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  Consumers’ reluctance to embrace rBST as a beneficial technology, as well as the 
presence of conflicting information regarding the safety of rBST in milk, bears many similarities 
to consumers’ reactions to the availability of genetically modified organisms (GMOs) and other 
biotechnology in food items.  There is a sizable segment of the population who believe that the 
reduction in prices brought about by GMOs and biotechnology in agriculture are not worth the 
risks to human health and the environment, even if these risks can be demonstrated to be 
insignificant.  In one study of consumers’ WTP for GMO food items, it was found that 35% of 
consumers were not willing to pay anything for food items containing any level of GMOs 
(Noussair, Robin, and Ruffieux 2004).  The other 65% of consumers in the study were willing to 
buy GMO food items at a reduced price, leading the authors to conclude that a segmented 
market, with items being clearly labeled as either containing or not containing GMOs, would 
lead to the most efficient outcomes for consumers, despite the additional costs for producers to 
separate their products between those with and without GMOs.  A separate study of the effects of 
labeling GMO products in Europe as compared to the United States came to a similar conclusion 
– in Europe, where GMO and non-GMO products have been labeled as such for years, the 
segmentation of the two product categories has been welfare enhancing for consumers; 
meanwhile in the United States, where labeling of GMO products is not required, the 
introduction of GMO labeling would likely be welfare enhancing with a small reduction in 
segregation costs (Lusk et al 2005).  
This type of market segmentation is analogous to the current situation with regards to 
rBST in milk.  Many consumers are unwilling to purchase milk containing rBST at any price, 
while some are willing to purchase milk containing rBST at a discount compared to rBST-Free 
and organic milk.  A recent ruling by the Pennsylvania Agriculture Department prohibiting milk 
producers from advertising their milk as rBST-Free highlights this tendency to discount the value 
and safety of milk produced with rBST.  According to Dennis Wolff, Pennsylvania’s Secretary 
of Agriculture, the ruling was made as a result of complaints that the hormone free label implies 
to consumers that there is a “nonsafe dimension” to conventional milk that would lead 
consumers to conclude that there is “'good' milk and 'bad' milk” (Martin 2007; USA Today 
2007).  Consumers continue to insist that they would like the option to avoid rBST in their milk, 
while the government maintains that conventional milk produced and milk produced without 
rBST are essentially the same. 
  It seems that consumers share many of their biases for GMO foods with rBST; the 
question of why this bias is present remains unclear.  There is a plethora of information available 
regarding the safety of rBST, and much of it conflicts.  In a study of decision making with 
divergent risk information, it was found that decision makers will put more weight on high-risk 
information than on low-risk information (Viscusi 1997).  Another study by Fox, Hayes, and 
Shogren (2002) on consumers’ reactions to food irradiation came to a similar conclusion – 
consumers’ WTP for irradiated pork decreased more after exposure to negative information than 
it increased from exposure to positive information regarding the pork.  Additionally, it seems that 
consumers are not adept at assessing food risks; in an experimental study of consumers’ WTP for 
increased food safety, it was found that participants were likely to rely more on personal 
experience than scientific information when determining their values for avoiding illness (Hayes 
et al. 1995).  This could very well be occurring in the case of rBST.  With the ease of acquiring 
information from the internet, it can be difficult for potential milk consumers to separate reliable 
information about rBST and human health risks from less reliable sources, especially since 
Canada, Japan, and a number of countries in Europe currently ban the use rBST entirely.  In a 
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situation such as this, with conflicting risk information, consumers may be putting more weight 
on the high-risk information (or existing personal beliefs) than on the more reliable low-risk 
information and adjust their purchasing behavior accordingly. 
A topic related to the emphasis on high-risk information is the concept of stigma.  
Stigma, originally a psychological term, can be thought of as “a negative feature that typically 
pervades and dominates an otherwise acceptable entity (Rozin 2004).”  Objects that are 
associated with a stigma normally share several characteristics.  Stigma is passed on via direct 
contact with a contaminated object in a phenomenon known as contagion (Rozin, Millman, and 
Nemeroff 1986).  Another key element of stigma, at least in Western societies, is that people 
tend to describe their feelings of revulsion for a stigmatized object in terms of how it impacts 
their health (as opposed to an object possessing some innate evil characteristic).  In other words, 
people “medicalize” the negative feelings they experience for a contaminated object (Rozin 
2004). 
There are other key aspects to stigma.  However, with regards to the possible 
stigmatization by rBST, the properties of contagion and medicalization of risk are especially 
salient.  Milk is considered a healthy, desirable food to consume until the milk undergoes contact 
with rBST via contagion, despite the lack of substantial chemical change in the milk.  People 
who see the addition of rBST to milk as a negative action tend to cite possible negative health 
consequences to humans and cows as justification for their views.  Both of these properties play 
into the possible role of production labeling in stigmatizing conventionally produced milk.  By 
distinguishing between conventionally produced and rBST-Free milk through the use of labeling, 
milk retailers can potentially tap into consumers’ fears regarding the safety of conventionally 
produced milk in order to charge higher prices for rBST-Free milk. 
Conventionally produced milk shares several of the characteristics of goods that are 
considered to be stigmatized.  In this article, we will expand upon these qualitative properties of 
rBST stigmatization and show experimentally that consumers’ psychological bias against 
conventional milk also has economic implications.  In the next sections, we describe the design 
and results of our experiment and show that consumers’ negative feelings towards rBST reduce 
their WTP for milk produced by cows treated with hormones. 
 
Experimental Design 
In order to determine whether the presence of rBST stigmatizes milk to consumers, a three-part 
experiment was designed (Table 1).  Part A consisted of rounds designed to familiarize 
participants with the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (BDM) (1964) bidding mechanism, where 
induced “cash values” were used.  Advantages of the BDM mechanism for private goods include 
its incentive compatibility and demand revealing properties, making it ideal for this experiment 
(Irwin et al. 1998).  Part B also used the BDM mechanism and had subjects submit bids to 
purchase a pencil.  Finally, Part C used the BDM mechanism to elicit WTP values for milk 
produced using three different production techniques (conventional milk, rBST-Free milk, and 
organic milk) and three fat types (0% skim, 1% lowfat, and 3.25% whole).  Each experiment 
session lasted approximately one hour, and the average earnings were $15. 
For each part of the experiment, participants received written instructions (Reviewer 
Appendix) with an oral explanation and were provided a chance to ask questions.  Subjects were 
seated randomly at computers that were equipped with privacy shields, and no communication 
was permitted between subjects.  Experiment data was collected using Excel spreadsheets 
programmed in Visual Basic and all information provided was kept confidential.  At the 
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completion of the experiment, participants were asked to fill out a questionnaire regarding their 
milk purchasing behavior and knowledge, their attitudes towards risk, and general demographic 
information.    
  Part A consisted of 5 rounds.  At the start of each round, t, participants were provided 
with a $5 initial balance, Yt, and were presented with a “cash value”, Vt, of $1, $2.50, or $4 
(Table 1).  Participants were then asked to record the highest amount that they would be willing 
to pay to receive that cash value – we refer to this amount as their “bid”, Bit.  Once all 
participants recorded their bids, a price, Ct, was drawn from a random numbers table containing 
values of $0 to $4.99 and announced to all the subjects.   
As described by Irwin et al. (1998), utility maximizing subjects in this mechanism submit 
a bid, given initial income, Y
0, that maximizes: 
(1)  .     
0
0 ()( ) ()( )
BE
B EU p C U Y E V C dR p C U Y E dR =+ + − ++ ∫∫
0
Examination of the left side of equation (1) shows that it is not in the best interests of a 
participant to bid below her WTP.  In the event that the randomly drawn price falls between her 
actual WTP and stated WTP, the participant loses the opportunity to earn a larger profit.  The 
logic behind not overstating WTP is shown in right side of equation (1). Participants would not 
want to submit a bid higher than their actual WTP – if a participant bids higher than their actual 
WTP, and the randomly selected price is between her actual WTP and stated WTP, the 
participant could potentially end up paying more than their value for an object.  The derivative of 
equation (1) with respect to B leads to: 
 (2)   
00 () [( ) ( ) ] 0
dEU
pBUY E V B UY E
dB
=+ + − − + =       
Since the probability of the bid being equal to the price (p(B) > 0), a participant who is 
maximizing their utility will submit bids equal to value (B=V), demonstrating the incentive 
compatibility of the mechanism. 
Each round produced two possible outcomes for the participants, depending upon their 
bids and the random price.  If the participant’s bid was greater than or equal to the random price 
(Bit > Pt), the participant purchased the cash value at the randomly selected price yielding a 
payoff of Yt + πt – Pt.  However, if the participant’s bid was less than the price (Bit < Pt), then the 
participant just retained the initial balance, Yt. 
The primary objective to Part A was to give subjects an opportunity to learn how the 
BDM mechanism operated.  To this end, the procedures followed those of Noussair, Robin, and 
Ruffieux (2004) as participants were informed that their best strategy for each round was to place 
a bid equal to the cash value (Bt = πt), as bidding an amount equal to the cash value results in the 
participants receiving the highest possible payoff for each round, regardless of the price.  To 
reinforce this message, at the conclusion of each round of Part A, participants were given the 
chance to view all of the bids from each subject in the round, as well as the random price and the 
payoff outcomes.  These bids were displayed on a screen at the front of the laboratory listed in 
order from the lowest bid to the highest bid without identifying which participants had submitted 
which bids.  The subjects could thus see how closely their own strategy for bidding matched the 
optimal strategy that would yield the highest possible earnings.   
Part B of the experiment served as a transition from Part A to Part C.  In part A, 
participants are asked to bid on an exogenously selected cash value which, for some participants, 
can be a difficult concept to understand.  Part B provides a bridge between Part A and Part C, so 
that participants can accustom themselves to implementing the BDM mechanism with a real-
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world object for which each person has a unique, endogenously-selected value.  In Part B, 
participants were asked to bid on a Ticonderoga-brand pencil (Table 1).  Part B consisted of a 
single round of bidding, participants were given an initial balance of $0.50, and they were asked 
to bid between $0 and $0.50 for a pencil.  Once all bids were submitted, a price between $0 and 
$0.49 was determined using a new random numbers table.  As in Part A, if the bid was equal to 
or greater than the price, the participant received the pencil, but had the price subtracted from 
their initial balance.  If the bid was lower than the price, the participant did not receive a pencil, 
but instead retained the entire initial balance of $0.50.  At the end of the round, pencils were 
handed out to participants where appropriate. 
For Part C, participants were given an initial balance of $5 and asked to submit a bid
2, 
ranging from $0 to $5, for nine different food items that would be presented sequentially.  
Participants were told that after submitting bids for each of the nine food items, they would learn 
which item and corresponding bids would be used to determine the final payout.  This selection 
was done randomly, and thus, subjects were advised to submit bids for each food item as if it 
would be the one used to determine cash earnings. 
The nine choices of Part C were presented in three flights based on production type – 
conventional, rBST-Free, and organic milk (Table 1).  For each flight of milk, participants were 
given a three-column taste-testing template (Figure 1), along with three five-ounce tasting cups 
filled with 0% skim milk, 1% lowfat milk, and 3.25% whole milk.   Participants were asked to 
taste each milk type and afterwards to answer two questions regarding the quality and freshness 
of each sample.
3   
To mimic the information provided in a grocery store setting, subjects were given 
handouts containing nutritional and production information for each flight of milk.  Importantly, 
the nutrition information differed only on fat type and not on the production technique (Figure 
2).  The information handout for rBST-Free milk included a statement that the milk “does not 
contain artificial growth hormones” and the organic milk include a statement that the milk was 
“produced without the use of antibiotics, synthetic growth hormones, or pesticides”.  The 
wording for both statements came directly from the labels on the cartons of the original milk. 
The information sheet for conventional milk did not make any claims regarding the production 
process.
4  To avoid and packaging or branding effect, all nine milks were served in a clear 
pitcher, and subjects did not see the brand of milks used in the experiment. 
Once all nine bids were placed and the milk type was selected, a price was drawn 
randomly, and the quarts of milk were distributed where appropriate.   
 
Results 
The experimental results show support for a stigma effect on conventional milk.  However, when 
looking at average WTP for milk of a given fat type, this stigma effect is difficult to detect.  For 
example, participant’s average willingness-to-pay for skim milk produced conventionally, 
produced without rBST, and produced using organic production practices are $1.06, $1.08, and 
$1.35 respectively (Table 2).  Contrary to our expectations, participants were actually willing-to-
pay a similar value for conventional milk and rBST-Free milk.  However, the stigma effect 
becomes apparent when we separate WTP by the order in which the milks were presented during 
Part C of the experiment.  As seen in table 3, when conventional milk was the first milk tasted 
and considered for purchase by participants, the mean WTP offer was $1.28.  Recall that subjects 
were not aware of what the other products were going to be, therefore, this measurement of WTP 
with the first flight of milks is relatively free of direct comparisons to other milk products.  
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However, when conventional milk was presented last (the third of three flights), the subjects 
were aware of the complete set of products, had the chance to taste all of them, and, much like in 
a modern grocery store, were presented with a wide variety of milk choices, average WTP values 
fall to $0.61.  On the other hand, the trend is very different for rBST-free, where the values 
generally increased.  For example, when rBST-Free milk was presented first, the mean WTP was 
$1.05; when the same milk was the presented last, the mean WTP increased to $1.15. 
The results also show some interesting behavior with regards to WTP bids of zero.  A 
WTP bid of zero indicates that a participant would not be willing to buy a given quart of milk at 
any price.  This type of shunning of products is a common behavioral response to stigmatized 
objects, although a zero bid is not necessarily indicative of the presence of stigma in all cases.  
Our results indicate that a similar number of participants were willing to pay some amount for 
conventional and rBST-Free milk.   For example, with regards to conventional milk presented 
last, 51% of participants were willing-to-pay some positive amount, while 55% of participants 
were willing to pay some positive amount for rBST-Free milk.  Organic milk, however, shows a 
much lower number of zero bids – 86% of participants were willing to pay some non-zero 
amount for a quart of organic milk.  These results suggest that participants view conventional 
and rBST-Free milks as comparable goods, with organic milk considered superior to both.  The 
number of non-zero bids may also lend credence to the stigma effect shown by the difference of 
the mean WTP when milk is presented first as compared to last.  For example, organic milk 
shows both consistently high WTP values and low numbers of non-zero bids (Figure 5), while 
milk produced with (without) rBST show mean WTP values that decrease (increase) 
substantially when the milk is presented last instead of first (Table 3), and at the same time 
exhibiting somewhat similar, lower (as compared to organic milk) numbers of non-zero bids 
(Figures 3 and 4).   
To obtain our WTP values, participants were asked to place bids between $0.00 and 
$5.00.  Hence, we utilize a two-limit tobit model to explain our data.  Participants gave WTP 
values for nine quarts of milk; the regression is run as a single equation, with WTP as the 
dependent variable and with dummy variables to indicate the fat content of the milk, as well as 
the method used to produce the milk.  Dummy variables were also used to indicate whether a 
participant was the primary shopper in the household, to indicate whether the participant was 
aware of the availability of rBST-Free and organic milks prior to the experiment, and to indicate 
gender.  Additional variables included the values for participant’s answers to the questions asked 
during the taste tests, how thirsty they were before tasting the milk samples, the frequency with 
which participants purchase milk produced with and without rBST and organic milk, a variable 
for risk preference, the number of children under ten in the participant’s household, highest level 
of education obtained, income, and a BDM mechanism variable indicating the participant’s 
deviation from the induced value in our final practice round during Part A. 
Most importantly for our analysis, a dummy variable was included to indicate the order in 
which milks produced using the different production techniques was presented.  Conventional 
milk is labeled as C, rBST-Free milk is labeled as R, and organic milk is labeled as O.  The order 
of presentation is indicated by the order of the letters coded.  For example, conventional milk 
presented before rBST-Free milk is coded as CR, organic milk presented before conventional 
milk is coded as OC, and so on.  For a given experiment session, if conventional milk was 
presented before rBST-Free milk, then the value of CR for all the bids during that session would 
be coded as one, and conversely, the values for RC (rBST-Free milk presented before 
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conventional milk) would be coded as a zero.  Using this naming convention, we end up with six 
dummy variables to indicate the order in which milks were presented. 
  The full model is broken down into six equations in order to isolate potential stigma 
effects on the WTP for milk.
5  The breakdown of the equations is as follows: since each 
participant gave WTP values for three milk products with varying fat levels produced using three 
different methods, each of the six equations utilizes the bids for only a single production 
technique as the dependent variable.  This results in two nearly identical equations for each 
production method, with the only differences being the treatment order dummy variable and the 
taste test data used.  For example, there are two equations for participants’ WTP for milk 
produced with rBST.  They are 
  (3)  WTPC = α + β1*TASTE_R + β2*TASTE_C + Full Model + β3*RC+ ε 
and 
  (4)  WTPC = α + β1*TASTE_O + β2*TASTE_C + Full Model + β3*OC + ε, 
where TASTE_C, TASTE_O, and TASTE_R represent the taste testing data for milk produced 
with rBST, without rBST, and organic milk, respectively, and RC and OC represent the order 
variables – RC indicating milk produced without rBST presented before milk produced with 
rBST, and OC indicating organic milk presented before milk produced with rBST.  Taste test 
data for milk produced using the production technique that is not being considered in the 
treatment order variable is omitted in each equation. 
  By setting up our equations in this manner, we are able to isolate the effects of varying 
the order of tasting and bidding in the different treatments on the participants’ WTP values.  If 
participants are willing-to-pay a significantly lower amount for conventional milk after they had 
tasted and considered purchasing rBST-Free milk and they did not lower their WTP for rBST-
Free milk when it was presented after conventional milk, then we have strong evidence that 
rBST-Free milk stigmatizes conventional milk. 
 
WTP for Conventional Milk: 
Equations (3) and (4) were the regressions run on WTP for conventional milk (Table 3).  In 
equation (3), the marginal effect coefficient for the order dummy variable RC is negative
6 (-
0.427) and significant (t = -2.30, p = 0.021) at the 5% level.  The negative value for the 
coefficient indicates that participants are willing-to-pay $0.427 per quart less for conventional 
milk after tasting and being exposed to information regarding rBST-Free milk (i.e. rBST-Free 
milk “Does not contain any artificial growth hormones”).  These results suggest that experiment 
participants view conventional milk more negatively after tasting and considering rBST-Free 
milk.  In addition, the differences in taste test scores between the two milks are not statistically 
significant (in fact, conventional milk scored slightly higher overall).  The very act of tasting and 
making a purchase decision on conventional milk after becoming aware of rBST-Free milk 
lowers participants’ WTP for milk produced with rBST, and supports the idea that conventional 
milk is a stigmatized good. 
  The presence of a negative and significant value for the coefficient on RC is not sufficient 
to infer a stigma effect on conventional milk.  We must also observe a lack of significance on the 
other order variables; otherwise, the only conclusion we may reach is the order of taste testing 
affects participants’ WTP for milk.  In equation (4), we find that the coefficient on the order 
variable OC is positive (0.053) and not statistically significant (t = 0.25, p = 0.802).  Therefore, 
we find no evidence that the order in which participants are presented conventional milk and 
organic milk affect their WTP for conventional milk. 
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  Several other variables besides the order dummy variables bear mentioning.  In equation 
(3), the coefficient for the dummy variable for 1% lowfat milk (FAT1) is positive (0.124) and 
significant (t = 2.09, p = 0.036) at the 5% level.  In other words, subjects are willing to pay 
$0.124 more for 1% milk relative to our baseline, skim milk.  In equation (4), the coefficient for 
the same variable was also positive (0.108) and significant at the 10% level (t = 1.82, p = 0.069).  
These results are not surprising, as 1% lowfat milk is the most popular fat content of milk 
commonly available for purchase; it appears that some consumers would be willing-to-pay more 
for lowfat milk than for skim milk.  The variable indicating whether the participant is their 
household’s primary shopper (PRIMSHOP) has a positive coefficient and is significant at the 5% 
level for both equations (3) and (4), suggesting that the household member who normally does 
the shopping is typically willing-to-pay more for conventional milk than those who do not.  The 
coefficient on the variable for risk preference
7 (RISKP) is positive in both equations (3) and (4), 
and is significant at the 5% and 10% level in equations (3) and (4) respectively (Eq. (3) t = 2.02, 
p = 0.043; Eq. (4) t = 1.88, p = 0.060).  In fact, the coefficient for RISKP is positive and 
significant in all six equations; judging by these results, one can conclude that participants who 
are concerned about the risk factors in the questionnaire are willing to pay more for milk in 
general, regardless of the production method.  The coefficient on the dummy variable indicating 
the participant was aware of the availability of organic milk previous to entering the experiment 
(ORGAV) is negative and significant at the 1% level in both equations – people who know of the 
existence of organic milk have lower WTP values for rBST-Free milk produced than participants 
who are not aware.  Additionally, the variable for the answer to the taste test question for 
conventional whole milk (TASTE_CWHOLE) has a positive coefficient in equation (3) (0.119) 
and is statistically significant at the 1% level (t = 2.57, p = 0.010). 
In equation (4), the coefficients on the variables for the answers to the taste test questions 
for organic lowfat milk (TASTE_OLOW) and organic whole milk (TASTE_OWHOLE) are 
negative and positive, respectively – both are significant at the 5% level (TASTE_OLOW: t = -
2.28, p = 0.022; TASTE_OWHOLE: t= 2.02, p = 0.044).  These results indicate that, for equation 
(3), participants are willing-to-pay more for conventional milk in general if they enjoy 
conventional whole milk.  For equation (4), participants are willing-to-pay less for conventional 
milk the more favorably they view the taste of organic lowfat milk.  Alternatively, they are 
willing to pay more for conventional milk the more favorable their opinion of organic whole 
milk.  Variables for income, gender, number of children under ten years old, and level of thirst 
before the experiment are not statistically significant. 
 
WTP for rBST-Free Milk:      
The regressions on WTP for rBST-Free milk are very similar to Equations (3) and (4) and the 
results are shown in table 5. 
(5)  WTPR = α + β1*TASTE_C + β2*TASTE_R + Full Model + β3*CR+ ε 
and 
(6)  WTPR = α + β1*TASTE_O + β2*TASTE_R + Full Model + β3*OR + ε. 
In equation (5), the coefficient on the order dummy variable CR is positive (0.358) and 
statistically significant (t = 1.99, p = 0.046) at the 5% level.  This coefficient can be interpreted 
in a similar manner to the coefficient on the order dummy RC in equation (3).  If participants 
express a lower WTP for conventional milk after tasting and considering purchasing rBST-Free 
milk, as discussed earlier, it stands to reason that participants would also be willing to pay more 
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for rBST-Free milk after tasting and considering purchasing conventional milk.  Thus, the stigma 
effect is consistent regardless of the order. 
  In equation (6), the coefficient on the dummy variable OR is negative (-0.254) and is not 
statistically significant (t = -1.33, p = 0.183).  As in the previous section, the order in which 
organic milk is presented relative to the milk produced using different techniques does not affect 
participants’ WTP values for those milks.  Therefore, the stigma effect on conventional milk 
appears to be coming from the direct comparison to rBST-Free milk, which appears to be viewed 
as a more direct substitute, and not due to comparisons to organic milk.  
We find similar results with respect to the coefficients on the other variables from 
equations (3) and (4).  Coefficients for PRIMSHOP are once again positive and statistically 
significant, while coefficients for ORGAV are negative and significant.  Unlike equations (3) and 
(4), however, the dummy variable for 1% lowfat milk (FAT1) is no longer significant; 
participants are willing-to-pay no more for 1% lowfat rBST-Free milk than they are for the other 
fat contents.  In addition, the coefficient on the taste test variable for the rBST-Free skim milk 
(TASTE_RSKIM) in both equations (5) and (6) are positive and statistically significant, implying 
participants with a favorable opinion of rBST-Free skim milk were WTP a larger value for 
rBST-Free milk.  The coefficient in equation (6) on the taste test variables for organic lowfat 
milk (TASTE_OLOW) and organic whole milk (TASTE_OWHOLE) were negative and positive, 
respectively, and both coefficients were statistically significant at the 10% level.  Participants 
with a favorable opinion of organic lowfat milk are willing-to-pay less for rBST-Free milk, in 
general, while those with a favorable opinion of organic whole milk were willing-to-pay more 
for rBST-Free milk.   
 
WTP for Organic Milk: 
The regressions on WTP for milk produced without rBST are similar to those presented 
previously, and the results are shown in table 5.   
(7)  WTPO = α + β1*TASTE_C + β2*TASTE_O + Full Model + β3*CO+ ε 
and 
(8)  WTPO = α + β1*TASTE_R + β2*TASTE_O + Full Model + β3*RO + ε. 
In equation (7), the coefficient on the order dummy variable CO is negative (-0.323) and not 
statistically significant (t = -1.44, p = 0.149).  In equation (8), the coefficient on the order 
variable RO is positive (0.215) and is not statistically significant (t = 0.92, p = 0.359).  The lack 
of significance on either order variable reinforces our results from the other WTP regressions; 
just as the order in which milks were sampled relative to organic milk did not impact the WTP 
values for milk produced with and without rBST, the order of taste testing similarly did not 
affect participant’s WTP for organic milk.  The consistency of these results is further evidence 
for the presence of a stigma effect on milk produced using rBST. 
  In terms of the coefficients on the non-order variables, we find results similar to those 
from equations (3) through (6).  The variable PRIMSHOP is again positive and significant in 
both equation (7) and equation (8), while ORGAV is negative and statistically significant.  The 
coefficients on the taste test variables for organic skim milk (TASTE_OSKIM) and organic whole 
milk (TASTE_OWHOLE) are positive and significant (the coefficient for TASTE_OSKIM in 
equation (5) is significant at the 10% level, p = 0.061) in both equations (5) and (6), implying 
that participants who view organic skim milk and whole milk favorably are willing-to-pay more 
for organic milk in general.  One notable difference in the WTP regressions for organic milk is 
the significance of the dummy variables for whole milk (FAT3).  The negative value and 
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statistical significance (t = -2.67, p = 0.008 in both equations (7) and (8)) of the variable suggests 
that participants are willing-to-pay less for whole organic milk than for other fat contents.  A 
possible explanation for this phenomenon could be the perception many consumers have of 
organic milk as a health food – those who purchase organic milk may be more likely to seek out 
skim and lowfat milk as opposed to whole milk due to their lower fat contents, and therefore be 
less inclined to pay a high amount for whole milk. 
 
Conclusion  
The economic implications of the stigmatization of goods have not been thoroughly examined.  
Producers of conventional items have frequently been concerned about the negative 
consequences that may result from the introduction of new similar products with labels touting 
better production methods, such as bird-friendly coffee, free-range chicken, sustainably-
harvested wood, eco-friendly bananas, and a variety of products marketed under the label of fair-
trade.  In the dairy industry, the use of recombinant bovine somatotropin (rBST), a synthetic 
version of a naturally occurring hormone, on milk-producing cows is an example of how stigma 
effects can have economic repercussions to the conventional product.  While the vast majority of 
studies have found that conventional milk is no more risky to consume for human health than 
rBST-free milk, the results of this research show that consumers have very different willing-to-
pay for the two products when the two products are presented in varying orders.  These results 
confirm the patterns observed in the marketplace, where firms can charge a price premium for 
rBST-Free milk and large retailers, such as Wal-Mart, have begun requiring that their suppliers 
not use rBST.
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Table 1.  Experiment Design 
 
 














$1, $2.50, $4 
 





$0.50 $0.00-$0.49  1  1  1:1 
C 
 
Quart of Milk 
 
Fat Types: 
0%, 1%, 3.25% 
 
Production Type: 
Conventional, rBST-Free, Organic 
 
$5.00 $0.00-$4.99  9  1  1:1 
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Table 2.  Mean WTP and Tasting Values for Milk, by Fat Type and Production Method. 
 
  WTP  0% 1%  3.25%  Overall 
Conventional $1.03  $1.11  $1.04  $1.06 
rBST-Free $1.06  $1.14  $1.02  $1.08 
Organic $1.40  $1.43  $1.23  $1.35 
        
Tasting Score       
Conventional 4.87  5.76 5.60 5.41 
rBST-Free 4.87  5.56  5.45  5.30 
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Table 3.  Mean WTP for Milk, by Fat Type, Production Method, and Order of Tasting 
 
 















Skim  $1.23 $0.55 $1.03 $1.14 $1.53  $1.32 
1% 
Lowfat  $1.37 $0.64 $1.16 $1.22 $1.39  $1.41 
3.25% 
Whole  $1.24 $0.63 $0.96 $1.09 $1.19  $1.34 
Sample 
Size  61    29 43 59 44  60 
  
All Fat 
Types  $1.28   $0.61   $1.05   $1.15   $1.37   $1.36  
Sample 
Size  183   87  129 177 132  180 
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Table 4.  Mean Tasting Values by Fat Type, Production Method, and Order of Tasting 
 
 















Skim  5.47 4.43  6  4.19 6.45 6.25 
1% 
Lowfat  6.22 5.07 6.67 5.22 6.57 6.93 
3.25% 
Whole  6.07 5.43 6.26 5.16 5.62 6.45 
Sample 
Size  61 29 43 59 44 60 
  
All Fat 
Types  5.92 4.98 6.31 4.86 6.21 6.54 
Sample 
Size  183 87 129 177 132  180  
Table 5.  Two-Limit Tobit Marginal Effect Coefficients 
 
    Dependent Variable 
 
                                         Conventional                rBST-Free                   Organic 
Variable             Eq. #:    1                2     3                  4
                      5                 6__________                      
TASTE_RSKIM              0.036        NA            0.141***    0.107**      NA          0.065 
                                              (0.049)                              (0.047)           (0.048)                                (0.055) 
TASTE_RLOW             -0.019         NA          -0.062        -0.017           NA          0.008 
                                              (0.061)                              (0.056)           (0.053)                                (0.070) 
TASTE_RWHOLE        -0.016         NA           0.101**      0.048           NA        -0.061 
                                              (0.046)                              (0.046)           (0.049)                                (0.057) 
TASTE_OSKIM              NA           0.066         NA             0.011          0.094*     0.117** 
                                                                    (0.045)                               (0.041)            (0.051)        (0.049) 
TASTE_OLOW               NA          -0.115**     NA           -0.105**    -0.065      -0.040 
                                                                     (0.050)                               (0.050)           (0.059)        (0.059) 
TASTE_OWHOLE          NA           0.101**     NA            0.133***    0.157*** 0.179*** 
                                                                     (0.050)                               (0.045)           (0.056)        (0.054) 
TASTE_CSKIM              0.056         0.051       -0.015          NA            0.033           NA 
                                               (0.051)          (0.048)         (0.050)                                 (0.057) 
TASTE_CLOW             -0.013          0.032      -0.001           NA            0.045           NA 
                                               (0.057)          (0.054)         (0.051)                                 (0.066)  
TASTE_CWHOLE         0.119***    0.047        0.040           NA          -0.013           NA 
                                               (0.046)          (0.050)         (0.040)                                 (0.057) 
 
FAT1                               0.124**      0.108*      0.101*      0.104*       0.034        0.035 
                                               (0.060)            (0.060)        (0.062)          (0.063)          (0.071)          (0.072) 
FAT3                               0.025          0.011       -0.049      -0.051        -0.190*** -0.189*** 
                                                (0.059)           (0.059)        (0.061)          (0.062)          (0.071)          (0.071)  
THIRSTY                        -0.019        -0.017       -0.012       0.004          0.057        0.052 
                                                (0.039)           (0.041)        (0.037)          (0.038)          (0.046)          (0.044) 
FREQCON                      0.106          0.131*      0.107       0.130*        0.061        0.009 
                                                (0.073)          (0.080)         (0.081)         (0.070)          (0.093)          (0.084)   
FREQRBST                    -0.153        -0.083      -0.088       -0.107         -0.005       -0.132 
                                                (0.139)          (0.140)         (0.106)         (0.126)           (0.139)         (0.139) 
FREQORG                      0.065          0.051         0.097       0.095          0.063       -0.051 
                                                (0.105)           (0.099)        (0.092)         (0.095)           (0.110)         (0.109)  
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Table 5. Continued 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
PRIMSHOP                     0.508**      0.620***   0.497**   0.681***    0.952*** 0.945*** 
                                                (0.228)           (0.215)         (0.218)        (0.213)           (0.235)         (0.249) 
RBSTAV                           0.152          0.116       0.281        0.185          0.240        0.332 
                                                (0.205)           (0.211)         (0.205)        (0.208)           (0.237)         (0.230) 
ORGAV                           -1.103***  -1.049** -0.976*** -0.947**    -1.60***  -1.448*** 
                                                (0.400)           (0.443)         (0.400)        (0.435)          (0.395)          (0.464) 
RISKP                              0.072**      0.070*      0.112*** 0.108***   0.149***   0.143*** 
                                                (0.036)           (0.038)         (0.037)        (0.037)          (0.045)          (0.043) 
MALE                               0.032         0.113        0.259       0.107          0.391         0.249 
                                                (0.206)           (0.242)        (0.228)         (0.225)          (0.243)          (0.258) 
CHU10                           -0.082        -0.041       -0.139      -0.170        -0.130        -0.126 
                                        (0.139)           (0.129)        (0.131)         (0.132)          (0.143)          (0.145) 
HIGHED                         -0.096*     -0.122**   -0.092      -0.077        -0.102*      -0.095 
                                                (0.058)           (0.055)        (0.057)        (0.055)           (0.062)           (0.065) 
INCOME                        -4.77e-7    -5.75e-7     1.35e-6     9.28e-7      3.93e-7      2.18e-6 
                                                 (0.000)          (0.000)        (0.000)        (0.000)           (0.000)           (0.000) 
BDM                                0.149          0.006       0.015       -0.146        -0.215       -0.144 
                                         (0.242)          (0.211)         (0.227)         (0.233)          (0.361)          (0.266) 
                                          
                                           RC             OC            CR            OR             CO             RO 
ORDER                           -0.427**     0.053        0.358**    -0.254       -0.323         0.215 
VARIABLE:                      (0.182)         (0.211)         (0.174)          (0.190)          (0.225)          (0.233) 
Log Likelihood                 -456.801  -461.878   -477.654   -474.783   -507.239    -505.118 
Wald χ
2                              78.37        81.75         80.82        90.88        119.68        99.25 
# of Uncensored                 249           250           257           257            274            274 
# of Left-censored              132           134           129           129            107            104 
# of Right-censored            24             24             19             19              27              27 
Notes:   Standard errors in parentheses.  
  Significance is indicated by * for 10% significance level; ** for 5% significance level; and *** for 1% 
significance level or less. 
  





1)  Please rate how closely this product 
matches your expectation of fresh, high 
quality milk (1 = Worse than Expected; 
5 = Meets Expectations; 10 = Better 
than Expected).   
 
Worse than                        Better than       
Expected                              Expected 
1    2    3    4   5    6    7    8     9    10 
 
2)  Please rate how much you like this 
product (from 1-10, with 10 being most 
favorable). 
 
   Least                                      Most  
Favorable               Favorable 
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Figure 2.  Nutritional Information Sheet 
 
 
Nutrition Information: 0% Fat (Skim) 
 
Serving Size:     1 cup (240 mL) 
Calories:   90 
Calories from Fat:  0 
 
% Daily Value* 
Total Fat:        0g   0% 
Saturated Fat:       0g   0% 
Trans Fat:    0-5mg 
Cholesterol:   0-5mg    0-1% 
Sodium:     125mg      5% 
Carbohydrate:   11-13g    4% 
Dietary Fiber:   0g    0% 
Sugar:    11-12g   
Protein:    8g    16% 
Vitamin A:       10% 
Calcium:          30% 
Vitamin D:      25% 
Vitamin C:      4% 
Iron:       0 %  
 
*% Daily Values are based on a 2000 calorie diet 
 
Ingredients: Fat Free Milk, Vitamin A Palmitate, 








Nutrition Information: 1% Fat (Lowfat) 
 
 
Serving Size:     1 cup (240 mL) 
Calories:     100-110 
Calories from Fat:  20 
 
% Daily Value* 
Total Fat:        2-2.5g   3-4% 
Saturated Fat:        1-1.5g   5-8% 
Trans Fat:    0g 
Cholesterol:   10mg    3% 
Sodium:     125mg      5% 
Carbohydrate:   11-13g    4% 
Dietary Fiber:   0g    0% 
Sugar:    11-12g   
Protein:    8g    16% 
Vitamin A:       10% 
Calcium:      30% 
Vitamin D:      25% 
Vitamin C:      4% 
Iron:       0 %  
 
*% Daily Values are based on a 2000 calorie diet 
 
Ingredients: 1% Lowfat Milk, Vitamin A Palmitate, 








Nutrition Information: 3.25% Fat (Whole)  
 
 
Serving Size:     1 cup (240 mL) 
Calories:     150 
Calories from Fat:   70 
 
% Daily Value* 
Total Fat:        8g   12% 
Saturated Fat:        5g   25% 
Trans Fat:    0g 
Cholesterol:   30-35mg    10-11% 
Sodium:     125mg      5% 
Carbohydrate:   11-12g    4% 
Dietary Fiber:   0g    0% 
Sugar:    11g   
Protein:    8g    16% 
Vitamin A:       4-6% 
Calcium:          30% 
Vitamin D:      25% 
Vitamin C:      4% 
Iron:       0 %  
 
*% Daily Values are based on a 2000 calorie diet 
 




  23 
Conventionally Produced Milk Tasted Third
Conventionally Produced Milk Tasted First 
Percentage Willing-to-Pay at a Particular Price







Figure 3.  Percentage of Subjects WTP for Conventionally Produced Milk 
at a Particular Price
 
 
rBST-Free Milk Tasted Third
rBST-Free Milk Tasted First
Percentage Willing-to-Pay at a Particular Price







Figure 4.  Percentage of Subjects WTP for rBST-Free Milk at a Particular 
Price
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Organic Milk Tasted Third
Organic Milk Tasted First 
Percentage Willing-to-Pay at a Particular Price







Figure 5.  Percentage of Subjects WTP for Organic Milk at a Particular 
Price 25 
 
                                                
 
 
1 In this article, conventional refers to the majority of milk sold in the marketplace, which is unlabeled and 
may or may not have been produced with rBST. 
2 All bids in Part C were made for one-quart cartons of milk. 
3 See Figure 1 in the Appendix for taste testing questions. 
4 To avoid potential problems with brand effects, subjects never saw the original containers for the milk.  
All milk was poured from clear plastic pitchers. 
5 There are actually twelve equations.  However, six of the equations are identical to the six we chose to 
analyze, with the signs reversed.  Our results hold for the six omitted equations as well. 
6Marginal effect coefficients deflate the tobit coefficients so that we may directly examine the marginal 
effect of increasing a given dependent variable one unit.  We cannot make this comparison with the normal 
tobit coefficients. 
7 The value for the risk preference variable is the mean of the answers to four questions regarding the 
participant’s attitudes towards the riskiness of pesticides, antibiotics, artificial hormones, and 
herbicides/fungicides – a higher number indicates a higher level of concern for a given risk factor. 